Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoy (1890–1938) was one of the most wide-ranging thinkers of the Russian emigration — a major linguist, philologist, historian, philosopher and political writer. He was born in 1890 in Moscow, the son of S.N. Trubetskoy, rector of Moscow University and a distinguished professor of philosophy. The family bore an ancient princely name and belonged to the Gediminid line, which had produced such prominent figures in Russian history as the boyar and diplomat Alexei Nikitich (d. 1680); field marshal Nikita Yuryevich (1699–1767); the writer Nikolai Nikitich (1744–1821), an associate of N.I. Novikov; the Decembrist Sergei Petrovich (1790–1860); the religious philosophers Sergei Nikolaevich (1862–1905) and Evgeny Nikolaevich (1863–1920); and the sculptor Pavel (Paolo) Petrovich (1790–1860).
Even in his gymnasium years Trubetskoy was seriously occupied with ethnography, folklore studies, linguistics, history and philosophy. In 1908 he entered the history and philology faculty of Moscow University; in 1912 he graduated from the first class of the department of comparative linguistics and was retained at the chair, after which he was sent to Leipzig to study the doctrines of the Neogrammarian school. On returning to Moscow he published a number of articles on North Caucasian folklore, Finno-Ugric languages and Slavistics, and took an active part in the Moscow Linguistic Circle. After the events of 1917 his academic career was interrupted: he left for Kislovodsk, then taught for a time at Rostov University, and gradually came to the view that the early Slavs were spiritually closer to the East than to the West.
In 1920 Trubetskoy left Russia for Bulgaria and took up a professorship at Sofia University. That same year he published his well-known book Europe and Mankind, which brought him to the threshold of the Eurasianist ideology. His work from then on moved along two lines: an academic one — the Prague Linguistic Circle, which became the world centre of phonology, followed by his years of research in Vienna — and a cultural-ideological one, tied to his participation in the Eurasianist movement. Together with P.N. Savitsky, P.P. Suvchinsky and G.V. Florovsky, he published in the Eurasian Annals and Chronicles and occasionally lectured in various European cities. Among his principal contributions to Eurasianism are his conception of the "upper" and "lower" strata of Russian culture and his doctrines of "true nationalism" and "Russian self-knowledge".
By temperament Trubetskoy preferred quiet scholarly work to politics. Although he had to write articles in the genre of political journalism, he avoided direct involvement in organisational and propaganda activity and regretted the moment when Eurasianism took a political turn. In the affair of the newspaper Eurasia he therefore took an uncompromising stance against the left wing of the movement and withdrew from the Eurasianist organisation, only resuming his publications in its renewed outlets several years later.
Trubetskoy spent his last years in Vienna, where he taught Slavistics at the University of Vienna. After the Anschluss he was harassed by the Gestapo; a significant part of his manuscripts was confiscated and later destroyed. According to L.N. Gumilyov — who had this from P.N. Savitsky — Trubetskoy was not arrested "only because he was a prince, an aristocrat, but his flat was repeatedly and very roughly searched, which brought on a myocardial infarction and an early death". He died on 25 July 1938, aged 48.
The text below is his programmatic memo of 1925 on the "national question" in the Caucasus. We preserve the author's wording; editorial changes are kept to a minimum.
All nations compassed me about: but in the name of the Lord will I destroy them. — Psalm 117:10
Transcaucasia
In Transcaucasia there are, first, the Armenians, who have always been and will always be committed to a Russian orientation, whatever the Russian government may be. Serious Armenian separatism is out of the question. Agreement with the Armenians is always easily reached. Yet to stake everything on the Armenians would be a mistake. Economically powerful, concentrating in their hands the direction of the whole economic life of Transcaucasia, they also arouse a universal antipathy among their neighbours which sometimes amounts to hatred. To identify oneself with them would be to draw that antipathy and hatred onto oneself. The example of pre-revolutionary policy, which ended with the Russians finding themselves alone with the Armenians and with every other nationality of Transcaucasia turned against them, should serve as a warning. Moreover the Armenian question is to some extent an international one: the Russian government's attitude to the Armenians of the Caucasus must be coordinated with relations between Russia and Turkey.
The Georgians, since the February Revolution, have won recognition of their rights — at least to autonomy — and these rights cannot now be contested. But at the same time, since this situation provides a pretext for the rise of Georgian separatism, any Russian government is bound to combat it. If Russia wishes to hold on to the oil of Baku — without which the retention not only of Transcaucasia but of the North Caucasus as well is scarcely possible — it cannot allow an independent Georgia. The difficulty and complexity of the Georgian problem lie precisely in the fact that to refuse Georgia a certain measure of autonomy is now practically impossible, while to concede it full political independence is inadmissible. A middle line must be taken here — one, moreover, that does not give cause for the development of Russophobic sentiments in Georgian society. One should also grasp that Georgian nationalism takes harmful forms only in so far as it becomes imbued with certain elements of Europeanism. Thus a correct solution of the Georgian question can be reached only on condition that a true Georgian nationalism arises — that is, a distinctive Georgian form of the Eurasianist ideology.
The Azerbaijanis, by their numbers, constitute the most important element in Transcaucasia. Their nationalism is strongly developed, and of all the peoples of Transcaucasia they are the most constant in their Russophobic sentiment. These Russophobic feelings go hand in hand with Turkophile feelings, nourished by pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian ideas. The economic importance of their territory — with the oil of Baku, the silk industry of Nukha and the cotton plantations of Mughan — is so great that their separation cannot be permitted. At the same time a certain and fairly substantial measure of autonomy must be granted to the Azerbaijanis. Here too the solution depends largely on the character of Azerbaijani nationalism, and sets as a task of first-rate importance the creation of a nationally Azerbaijani form of Eurasianism. In this case Shi'ism must be set up as a counter to pan-Islamism.
The three national problems of Transcaucasia — Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani — are intertwined with problems of foreign policy. A Turkophile policy would push the Armenians toward a British orientation. The same result would follow from a policy staked on the Azerbaijanis. England, in any case, will intrigue in Georgia, understanding that an independent Georgia would inevitably become a British colony. And in view of the inevitability of these intrigues, it would be disadvantageous to make the Armenians in Georgia into Anglophiles and thus strengthen the ground for British intrigue in Transcaucasia. Yet a policy staked on the Armenians would likewise lead to a Turkophile orientation among the Azerbaijanis and to Russophobic feeling in Georgia. All of this must be kept in mind when establishing relations with the peoples of Transcaucasia.
Government under the Curial System
The complexity of the national question in Transcaucasia is aggravated by the fact that the separate nationalities are hostile to one another. Some of the grounds for hostility are removed under a curial, multi-parliamentary system and the technique of government connected with it. Under such a system it is possible, for example, in a whole series of areas of life, to differentiate the administration not by territory but by nationality — which blunts the sharpness of disputes over which autonomous unit a district with a mixed population should belong to. Thus, for instance, the question of the language of instruction in schools in such districts loses all its acuteness: within one and the same locality there exist schools using different languages, and each such school is under the authority of the corresponding national council of public education. But of course there is a range of matters in which administration must naturally be organised on a territorial rather than a national basis. Not only the old division into governorates, based on accidental and often artificial features, but also the division into three main regions (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) should be abolished. The Transcaucasian ulus should be firmly divided into small districts corresponding more or less to the former uyezdy, with the difference that the borders of these districts should be adjusted more precisely to ethnographic-historical, social and economic boundaries.
The ancient motto of imperialist statecraft, "Divide and rule", applies only where the state power or the ruling nation has to deal with a hostile alien population. Where the task of the state is to bring about an organic unity between the native population and the ruling nation for common work, that principle is inapplicable. Therefore in the Caucasus, too, one should not seek to deepen frictions and contradictions between the separate nationalities. With all the variety of shades of democratic culture and daily life in the different regions of Georgia, it still forms a certain ethnographic whole which cannot be artificially divided into parts. The Georgian language, as the language of Church and literature, has been since ancient times the common language of the educated classes of Georgia, Mingrelia and Svaneti. While allowing for the existence of Mingrelian and Svan alongside it, and not hindering the development of literature in these languages, one must resist with all one's might the artificial creation of new — historically insufficiently justified — independent and separatist (in relation to Georgia) national units.
It does not, however, follow from the above that one should encourage the tendency of larger peoples to absorb smaller ones. Such tendencies exist in certain borderlands between Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus: there is an observable drive to Georgianise Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and to Tatarise (i.e. Turkicise) the southern districts of Dagestan and the Zakatala district. Since in these cases a definite national physiognomy is being deformed, the phenomenon must be combated by supporting the national resistance of the peoples concerned.
In seeking not to allow the secession of the borderlands, one must take into account all the psychological factors that feed separatist aspirations on the periphery. It is impossible not to notice that among the common people such aspirations are not developed at all, or are very weakly developed; the chief bearer of separatist aspirations is the local intelligentsia. An important role in the psychology of this intelligentsia is played by the principle that "it is better to be first in the village than last in the city". The sphere of activity of some minister of a "sovereign" republic that has replaced a former governorate often differs in no way from the sphere of activity of the former provincial official. But it is more flattering to be called a minister, and therefore the minister clings to the sovereignty of his republic. When a governorate is turned into an independent state, a whole range of new positions inevitably appears, into which members of the local intelligentsia move — people previously forced either to be content with minor posts in their governorate or to serve outside it. Finally, "sovereignism" flourishes especially in regions where the local intelligentsia is relatively small, so that formerly the main body of officials was recruited from incomers: once the incomer element, which has fallen into the category of "foreign subjects", is expelled, the young republic begins to feel a shortage of educated people, and every local member of the intelligentsia finds it very easy to make a career. Sovereignism is thus as often as not a "class" movement of the local intelligentsia, which feels that it has benefited as a class from sovereignty. But of course the local intelligentsia carefully conceals and masks this class character behind "ideas": "historical traditions" and local national culture are hastily invented. There is no doubt that the population of the region in question suffers rather than gains from this class-intelligentsia sovereignism. For this entire "independence" is directed, on the one hand, to an artificial rise in demand for educated labour, to an increase in the number of people drawing a state salary and thus living off taxes on the population, and, on the other, to the elimination of competition from the intelligentsia of other regions, to a shrinking of the field of contest and hence to a lowering of the quality of the local officialdom. It is natural, therefore, that the common people are often hostile to the separatist aspirations of the local intelligentsia and display centralist tendencies — on which, for instance, the Bolsheviks undoubtedly played when they liquidated the independence of various Transcaucasian republics.
The North Caucasus
In the North Caucasus there are the Kabardians, the Ossetians, the Chechens, a number of smaller peoples (Circassians, Ingush, Balkars, Karachays, Kumyks, Turkmens and Kalmyks) and, finally, the Cossacks.
The Kabardians and the Ossetians have always held fairly firmly to a Russian orientation. Most of the smaller peoples present no particular difficulties in this respect. The only definite Russophobes in the North Caucasus are the Chechens and the Ingush. Ingush Russophobia is due to the fact that after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, raids and brigandage — which had always been the chief occupation of the Ingush — began to be punished severely; meanwhile the Ingush cannot switch to other occupations, partly because of an atavistic unwillingness to do manual labour, partly because of a traditional contempt for work, which is considered exclusively women's business. An ancient Oriental ruler of the Darius or Nebuchadnezzar type would simply have subjected this little bandit tribe — a nuisance to the peaceful life not only of the Russians but of all its other neighbours — to wholesale extermination, or would have moved its population somewhere far from their homeland. If such a simplified solution is to be discarded, there remains only the attempt, by means of properly organised public education and the improvement of agriculture, to break up the old conditions of daily life and the traditional contempt for peaceful labour.
The Chechen question is somewhat more complicated. In the first place, there are five times as many Chechens as Ingush; in the second, Chechen Russophobia is caused by the fact that the Chechens feel themselves to have been cheated materially: their best lands have been taken by Cossacks and Russian settlers, and the oil of Grozny is extracted on their territory though they get no revenue from it. To satisfy these Chechen claims in full is of course impossible. Good-neighbourly relations, however, must be established. This can be done, again, by properly organised public education, by raising the level of agriculture, and by drawing the Chechens into an economic life shared with the Russians.
In terms of their social structure, the peoples of the North Caucasus fall into two groups: peoples with an aristocratic structure (Kabardians, Balkars, part of the Circassians, Ossetians) and peoples with a democratic structure (part of the Circassians, Ingush and Chechens). Among the first group, supreme authority was enjoyed on the one hand by the elders, and on the other by the Muslim clergy. The Bolsheviks are systematically working to destroy both social orders. If they succeed in this, the peoples of the North Caucasus will find themselves deprived of the very groups and classes that would carry authority in the eyes of the masses. Meanwhile, given their character, these peoples, without the guidance of such authoritative groups, turn into wild bands of brigands ready to follow any adventurer.
The North Caucasus also includes Cossack regions — the Terek and the Kuban. In the Terek region there is no particular Cossack question: Cossacks and non-Cossack settlers live on friendly terms, regarding themselves as a single nation set against the non-Russian peoples. In the Kuban region, by contrast, the Cossack question is very acute: Cossacks and non-Cossack settlers are hostile to one another.
At the eastern and western edges of the Caucasus there are regions that cannot be fully assigned either to Transcaucasia or to the North Caucasus: in the east this is Dagestan, in the west, Abkhazia.
Dagestan
The position of Dagestan is such that a very wide autonomy must be granted to it. At the same time Dagestan is far from homogeneous, both in its ethnic composition and in its historical divisions. Before the Russian conquest Dagestan was divided into a whole series of small khanates, completely independent of one another and subordinate to no supreme power. The traditions of that former fragmentation have survived in Dagestan down to the present day. A major obstacle to the administrative unification of Dagestan is the absence of a common language. Formerly things went so far that official correspondence and record-keeping were conducted in Arabic, and Russian governmental announcements were published in the same language. There are too many native languages: in the Andi district, along a 70-verst stretch of the Andian Koisu, thirteen different languages are spoken; altogether there are about thirty native languages in Dagestan. Several "international" languages exist, serving as means of communication among the mountaineers of different auls. These are Avar and Kumyk in the northern part and Azerbaijani in the southern part of Dagestan. Obviously one of these "international" languages must be made the official one.
But it is by no means a matter of indifference which of them is chosen for the purpose. Kumyk serves as the "international" language of almost the whole North Caucasus — from the Caspian Sea up to and including Kabarda; Azerbaijani dominates in the greater part of Transcaucasia (except the Black Sea coast) and, moreover, in Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan and Northern Persia. Both of these languages are Turkic. One must bear in mind that, as economic life intensifies, the use of "international" languages acquires such a weight that it displaces native languages: many auls of the southern districts of Dagestan have already become wholly "Azerbaijani-speaking". It can scarcely be in Russia's interest to allow such a Turkization of Dagestan. For if the whole of Dagestan becomes Turkicised, one will end up with a solid Turkic mass stretching from Kazan to Anatolia and Northern Persia — which will create the most favourable conditions for the development of pan-Turanian ideas of a separatist, Russophobic tendency. Dagestan must be used as a natural barrier against the Turkization of this part of Eurasia.
In the northern and western districts of Dagestan the matter is comparatively simple. Here Avar should be recognised as the official language — it is in any case the native language of the population of the Gunib and Khunzakh districts, and the international language of the Andi, Kazi-Kumukh, and parts of the Dargin and Zakatala districts. The development of Avar literature and press should be encouraged, and the language should be introduced into all lower schools of the named districts, as well as into the corresponding secondary schools as a compulsory subject.
The situation is more complicated in the other parts of Dagestan. Of all the South-Dagestani peoples, the largest is the Kürin (Lezgin), which occupies almost the whole of the Kürin district, the eastern half of the Samur district, and the northern part of the Kuba uyezd of Baku governorate. Of all the non-Turkic native languages of this part of Dagestan, Kürin is the simplest and easiest, and is closely related to several other native languages of the same region. It could therefore be made the "international" and official language for this part of Dagestan. In this way Dagestan would, linguistically, be divided between two native languages — Avar and Kürin.
Abkhazia
For Abkhazia, Abkhaz should be recognised as the official language, the development of an Abkhaz intelligentsia should be encouraged, and in that intelligentsia an awareness of the need to resist Georgianisation should be instilled.
This article was written in 1925.